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Abstract 
Environmental policies may have important consequences for firms’ competitiveness or 
profitability. However, the empirical literature shows that hardly any statistically significant 
effects on firms can be detected for the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS). On the basis of existing literature, we focus on potential explanations for why the 
empirical literature finds hardly any significant competitiveness effects on firms, least 
not during the first two phases of the scheme (2005-2012). We also reason why the third 
phase (2013-2020) could reveal similar results. We show that the main explanations for this 
finding are a large over-allocation of emissions certificates leading to a price drop and the 
ability of firms to pass costs onto consumers in some sectors. Cost pass-through, in turn, 
partly generated windfall profits. In addition, the relatively low importance of energy costs 
indicated by their average share in the budgets of most manufacturing industries may limit 
the impact of the EU ETS. Finally, small but significant stimulating effects on innovation have 
been found so far. These different aspects may explain why the empirical literature does not 
find significant effects from the EU ETS on firms’ competitiveness.  
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1. Introduction 
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the largest market for greenhouse 
gas emissions worldwide covering more than 11,000 manufacturing and power plants and about 
45% of the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions in 31 countries (DG CLIMA
1
). It serves as an 
important example for the design of other carbon markets such as the one in China. At the same 
time, there are strong concerns that carbon trading may entail negative side effects on 
competitiveness and employment of regulated companies. This is because regulated firms seem 
to face additional costs either because of abatement or because of purchasing emissions 
allowances. However, the empirical literature evaluating the EU ETS finds no significant negative 
effects on firm-level indicators for competitiveness, at least not for the first two trading phases. 
Therefore, this paper attempts to explain why – against ex ante expectations – no negative side 
effects of the EU ETS on firms’ competitiveness have been documented empirically, so far. 
Understanding the economic effects of emissions trading well is important for at least three 
reasons. First, understanding the economic side effects of environmental policies is vital for 
reducing the cost of achieving certain environmental goals. Put differently, efficient climate policy 
needs to achieve the policy goals at the least possible cost. Second, emissions trading has 
distributional effects such that certain firms or sectors may benefit while others may face 
additional challenges (Flues, Thomas, 2015). It is crucial to identify these likely winners and the 
sectors in need for additional support, in order to be able to implement a successful ambitious 
climate policy and minimise the risk of carbon leakage. Finally, policy-makers often use the 
argument of job losses or gains when trying to implement environmental policies. Special interest 
groups or lobbies also play a role in shaping concerns about potential job losses. Therefore, 
understanding the effects of climate policies on outcomes such as employment is important. 
In theory, a cap-and-trade system imposes extra costs on firms (e.g., Deschenes, 2014). This is 
because they either have to implement abatement activities or to purchase emissions certificates 
unless there is free allocation. In addition, firms face transaction costs and costs for monitoring, 
reporting and verification of emissions (MRV). These costs may lead to a loss of competitiveness 
depending on the market structure and on the design of the policies, e.g. exemptions. Moreover, 
the effects are contingent on who is covered by the policy, e.g. whether it is a unilateral policy. It 
is of relevance whether (foreign) competition exists and which regulation competitors underlie. 
Notwithstanding, environmental policies could also have positive effects on firms’ 
competitiveness. For example, these policies might trigger innovation with potentially positive 
consequences (Porter, 1995; Porter, van der Linde, 1996). Also, firms might benefit if emissions 
certificates are freely allocated and over-allocated, and have a positive value on the emissions 
market. Hence, there may be positive and negative partial effects from an emissions trading 
scheme where the overall effect is not generally clear.  
While for the Clean Air Act Amendments in the US substantial negative effects on firm level 
competitiveness have been documented (e.g., Greenstone, 2002, 2012; Becker, Henderson, 
2000), it is surprising that the empirical ex post literature on firm-level effects of the EU ETS 
shows hardly any significant negative impacts on the competitiveness of regulated firms during 
Phase I and II (for overviews see Venmans, 2012; Arlinghaus, 2015; Martin et al., 2016; also 
Dechezleprêtre, Sato, 2014; Jaraite, Di Maria, 2016). Still, there appear to be significant 
reductions in carbon emissions in manufacturing as a result of the EU ETS (Wagner et al., 2014; 
Petrick, Wagner, 2014; Ellerman et al., 2016). Meanwhile, hardly any negative effects on 
competitiveness can be detected. For Germany, no statistically significant negative effects of the 
EU ETS on employment or gross output or exports can be documented (Petrick, Wagner, 2014). 
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 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm, last  retrieved 11/08/2016 
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There is also no indication that over- or under-allocation of EUAs significantly affects firm revenue 
or employment, at least not in the very early period of the EU ETS (Anger, Oberndorfer, 2008). 
Preliminary results for France show significant reductions in employment (on the order of -7%, 
see Wagner et al., 2014) which may be partly driven by carbon leakage and should be 
considered as the upper bound (ibid.). Negligible competitiveness effects have also been shown 
in a cross-sector comparison for the entire European Union (Abrell et al., 2011). Even when 
focusing on energy intensive industries, no negative effects on firm level competitiveness were 
found for cement or iron and steel industries (Chan et al., 2013). In the power sector, despite 
rising unit material costs, revenue might even have increased substantially (ibid.).  
This study contributes to the literature by trying to determine why researchers do not find 
significant negative effects of the EU ETS on firm-level competitiveness between 2005 and 2012. 
Although the third trading period (2013-2020) is still running and there is thus no comprehensive 
empirical evidence for Phase III, yet, we reason about why this period could also reveal negligible 
effects on competitiveness, if any. We limit the analysis to competitiveness at the firm level thus 
excluding the country level perspective. By “competitiveness” we mean a firm’s long run profit 
performance as measured by turnover, value added or employment (Dechezleprêtre, Sato, 2014, 
p. 6). The focus is on direct effects from the EU ETS whereas indirect effects, such as through 
rising electricity prices, are covered only briefly. We proceed by presenting and then checking five 
potential explanations. As we base all arguments on existing literature, this present study is by 
itself also a literature review. While existing literature reviews constitute the starting point of this 
study, we go beyond these by screening five hypotheses explaining why almost no 
competitiveness effects could be documented so far. 
We start from the observation that emissions certificates have so far been mostly allocated for 
free. Thus, firms have hardly faced any costs of purchasing EUAs but only transaction costs and 
opportunity costs. Second, the results show that there has been a large over-allocation of 
emissions certificates leading to a price drop which, in turn, reduced the costs of buying additional 
certificates and with it reduced the incentives to abate emissions. Third, firms have been able to 
pass-through the costs of emissions trading onto consumers at least in some sectors, most 
prominently in the power sector. This fact in combination with large amounts of free allocation of 
certificates has generated windfall profits for some firms. Fourth, the energy cost share in 
production is on average rather low but this may hide distributional differences on the firm level. 
Fifth, small but statistically significant stimulating effects on innovation have been found, 
potentially small due to the low price of certificates. These results suggest that the EU ETS has 
effectively reduced greenhouse gas emissions without incurring significant negative 
competitiveness effects. . However, we leave the question open of whether costs and benefits of 
the scheme are balanced.  
This paper is structured as follows: The next section gives a brief overview over relevant 
institutional aspects of the EU ETS. Then, section 3 presents an overview over the existing 
empirical literature on the effects of market-based environmental policies on firm-level 
competitiveness. Section 4 checks five hypotheses on the EU ETS, one by one, by collecting 
existing empirical findings. These are first free allocation, second over-allocation, third cost pass-
through, fourth energy cost shares and fifth innovation. Finally, section 5 concludes.  
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2. Institutional background of the EU ETS 
The EU Emissions Trading Scheme was launched by the European Commission in 2005 in the 
framework of the Kyoto Protocol (Directive 2003/87/EC
2
). It constitutes the largest carbon cap-
and-trade system worldwide. The overall amount of carbon emissions is capped by allocating 
only a limited amount of emissions certificates called European Union Allowances (EUAs) which 
can then be traded. The first trading phase – which was considered a trial phase – ran from 2005 
to 2008. Phase II ran from 2009 to 2012. Phase III is running from 2013 to 2020 and is seen as a 
reinforcement of the system. Country-specific National Allocation Plans (NAPs) used to define the 
cap as well as how allowances are allocated to individual installations, giving the EU ETS a highly 
decentralised character during Phase I and II (Kruger et al., 2007; Ellerman et al., 2016). Since 
Phase III, an EU-wide cap has been replacing the NAPs system, so as to reduce uncertainty.
3
 In 
addition, auctioning has become the default allocation rule
4
 replacing grandfathering. Several 
aspects of the design of the scheme are relevant for understanding the channels for potential 
competitiveness effects. 
Figure 1: Past and projected emissions and emissions reduction targets 
  
Figure 1 shows past and projected emissions together with emissions reduction targets. The 
initial target was to reduce emissions in CO2 equivalents by 20% by 2020 as compared to 1990 
levels. This joint reduction commitment was already over-achieved by the European Member 
States in the second period of the EU ETS (2008-2012). According to 2015 projections, 
emissions are estimated to be 24% lower by 2020 compared to the levels of 1990 (EU 
Commission, 2015), i.e. lower than the initial target of 20%.
5
 While it is uncertain whether this is 
the result of costly abatement and cleaner production or production slowdown, the fact is that now 
this constraint may not be binding anymore. In response, the Commission set a more ambitious 
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 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32003L0087 , last retrieved 24/09/16 
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 Under the NAPs system, each country had to submit its NAP to the Commission for approval. This process turned out to be 
very time-consuming and complex as it led to protracted negotiations between the Commission and several Member States. 
See http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/pre2013/nap/index_en.htm, last retrieved 17/08/2016 
4
 However, free allocation still represents about half of allocated permits, since manufacturing sectors are exempted from full 
auctioning. See section 4.1 and http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/allowances/index_en.htm, last retrieved 06/09/2016 
5
 The current long-term target is a 21% reduction by 2020 compared to 2005. 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm, last retrieved 11/08/2016 
Source: EU Commission (2015), p. 4.  
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target according to which emissions need to be reduced by 40% by 2030 (compared to 1990 
levels).
6
 As part of this overall target, the emissions cap of the EU ETS will decrease annually by 
2.2% from 2021 onwards instead of 1.74% so far. As the figure shows, this will require additional 
efforts of abatement. 
In order to reach the emissions target, firms owning a regulated installation have to provide the 
amount of EUAs corresponding to the amount of emitted carbon dioxide on a yearly basis. 
Emission allowances were grandfathered at the beginning of the scheme and later partly 
auctioned, as detailed in section 4.1. Regulated industries are energy-intensive industries within 
the manufacturing and the power sector, i.e. combustion installations with a rated thermal input 
capacity of at least 20 MW, refineries, coke ovens, steel plants, and installations producing 
cement clinker, lime, bricks, glass, pulp, and paper. In total, the EU ETS covers about 50% of 
Europe’s CO2 emissions and 40% of its total greenhouse gas emissions (Schleich et al., 2007). 
Since 2012, the aviation sector has also been added to the EU ETS (Directive 2008/101/EC) 
taking into account some peculiarities of this sector.
7
 While auctioning applies to power 
generators since 2013 and is said to represent the default allocation method of the third period, 
all manufacturing sectors receive allowances according to benchmarking. The benchmark value 
is product-specific and equals the average CO2 emissions of the best performing 10% of 
installations for this product (European Commission Climate Action).
8,9
 Manufacturing industries 
receive a decreasing
10
 share of their historic production needs multiplied by the product 
benchmark. At the same time, there are exceptions in order to explicitly “safeguard the 
competitiveness of industries covered by the EU ETS” (European Commission Climate Action
11
). 
Since the third trading phase, these exceptions have been regulated according to the estimated 
risk of carbon leakage (under an amendment to Directive 2003/87/EC). Accordingly, a sector or 
sub-sector is deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage if it meets one of the 
following criteria
12
:  
1) if direct and indirect costs induced by the implementation of the directive increase 
production cost, calculated as a proportion of the gross value added, by at least 5%; and 
the sector's trade intensity with non-EU countries (imports and exports) is above 10%.
13
  
2) the sum of direct and indirect additional costs is above 30% 
3) the non-EU trade intensity is larger than 30% 
Installations in sectors exposed to carbon leakage risk are eligible to 100% free allowances up to 
the benchmark (de Bruyn et al., 2013). This preferential treatment concerns 154 out of 258 
NACE-4 level sectors, representing 95% of 2005 and 2006 industrial emissions (ibid.).  
Firms participating in the EU ETS can shift their unused allowances to subsequent periods. As 
defined by the European Commission: “Since phase 2 (2008), if an ETS participant has a surplus 
of allowances at the end of a trading-phase it can ‘bank’, or in other words carry forward, these 
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 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2030/index_en.htm, last retrieved 11/08/2016 
7
 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/aviation/index_en.htm, last retrieved 22/09/2016 
8
 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/allocation/index_en.htm, last retrieved 11/08/2016 
9
 This system is said to constitute a rewarding mechanism that may enforce incentives for innovation. Indeed, only the most 
efficient 10% of installations receive enough allowances to cover their needs. Less efficient firms have to pay for extra permits. 
Thus, they face the incentive to reduce their emissions at least up to the benchmark value (de Bruyn et al. 2010b). 
10
 80% in 2013 to 30% in 2020 (de Bruyn et al., 2013) 
11
 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/allowances/leakage/index_en.htm, last retrieved 11/08/2016 
12
 Moreover, sectors close to the threshold levels could ask for a qualitative assessment and potentially being considered at risk 
of carbon leakage (De Bruyn et al., 2013) 
13
 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/allowances/leakage/index_en.htm, last retrieved 11/08/2016 
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allowances to count towards its obligations in the next phase.” (EU ETS Handbook, Climate 
Action, p. 133
14
). Note that in the first trading period, permits could not be banked beyond 2007. 
As an alternative to submitting EUAs according to the amount of verified emissions, installations 
could submit alternative offsets from the Kyoto Protocol during Phase II but only to a limited 
extent. These alternative offsets were Emission Reduction Units (ERU) generated from Joint 
Implementation (JI) activities or Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) generated from the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) project activity. Concerning the emissions reduction target for 
2030, the Commission and the Parliament have proposed that using international offsets should 
not be a possible option to meet the 40% target (Carbon Market Watch, 2014). 
 
3. Literature overview on competitiveness effects 
Estimating the causal effect of the EU ETS is a difficult empirical challenge due to different 
reasons. First and above all, treatment assignment is not random but depends on capacity
15
, a 
treatment assignment variable usually not observed by the researcher. Thus, regulated firms are 
systematically different from non-regulated firms. This challenge is often addressed by employing 
statistical matching procedures. Second, and equally important, for a methodologically clear 
comparison of regulated and non-regulated companies, there must be no spill-over effects, for 
example through energy prices. This would violate the stable unit treatment value assumption 
(SUTVA; see Rubin, 1978, 1980, 1990; Angrist, Imbens, Rubens, 1996) which is usually required 
for the econometric approaches in question. Third, it is difficult to separate the causal effect of the 
EU ETS from other policies’ effects especially when introduced at around the same time. These 
confounding policies may be country-specific energy policies such as the Renewable Energy 
Sources Act (EEG) in Germany. Fourth, data availability and access are of crucial importance. 
We will now give a brief overview on empirical ex post evaluation studies. More details on the 
competitiveness and other firm-level effects of environmental policies can be found in the 
excellent reviews by Venmans (2012), Arlinghaus (2015) and Martin et al. (2016). 
The empirical ex post literature on firm-level effects of the EU ETS finds hardly any indication for 
negative competitiveness effects, least not for the first two trading periods. Based on firm-level 
data for the manufacturing industries, Wagner et al. (2014) and Petrick and Wagner (2014) 
compare regulated to non-regulated companies in France and in Germany, respectively. Using 
differences-in-differences estimators with matching, they find significant reductions in carbon 
emissions in both countries for the first half of the second trading phase. Interestingly, while the 
preliminary results for France show significant reductions in employment on the order of 7% for 
the early second trading phase, no negative competitiveness effects can be detected in the 
analysis of Germany. This holds for employment as well as for gross output and exports. The 
effects on gross output and exports in Germany might even be slightly positive. One potentially 
important channel for finding negative results for France is carbon leakage as explicitly discussed 
by Wagner et al. (2014).
16
 For Germany, Petrick and Wagner (2014) cannot separate the effects 
of the EU ETS from those of the changes made to the German Renewable Energies Act. For 
Germany, Anger and Oberndorfer (2008) analyse regulated German companies in the early 
period of 2004-2005 taking the ratio of EUAs to verified emissions as explanatory variable of 
interest. This indicator for over-allocation shows no statistically significant effects on changes in 
                                                     
14
 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/publications/docs/ets_handbook_en.pdf, last retrieved 11/08/2016 
15
 More precisely, “capacity” refers to the rated thermal input for combustion installations and specific capacity thresholds for 
plants within specific industrial activities. 
16
 According to Martin et al. (2014a), the risk of carbon leakage and thus job loss due to the EU ETS could be substantially 
reduced by means of an efficient permit allocation scheme. 
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firm revenue or in employment. However, their results could be biased by early abatement 
activities. For Lithuania – the most over-allocated country in the EU ETS – Jaraite and Di Maria 
(2016) also find no significant economic effects on regulated firms. They stress that this result 
also implies that there have not been any huge windfall profits for these firms. For the specific 
case of the Lithuanian power sector, they suspect a relevant amount of carbon leakage by means 
of closing one large reactor and increasing electricity imports from neighbouring countries. Abrell 
et al. (2011) empirically analyse manufacturing firms in the entire European Union. Using 
propensity score matching, they compare regulated firms to firms from all non-regulated sectors. 
Hence, sectoral trends could confound their results. These show no statistically significant effects 
of the EU ETS on firms’ value added or profit margins. Still, for employment they detect a small 
but statistically significant effect of -0.9% for the first trading phase which appears to be driven by 
the non-metallic mineral sector. Considering only the industry sector for identification of ETS 
participation, Commins et al. (2011) report statistically significant negative effects on total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth for the first period of the EU ETS. However, keep in mind that treatment 
identification is very crude and driven exclusively by cross-sector differences. 
Turning from manufacturing to more specific industrial sectors, Chan et al. (2013) study firms in 
the power, cement, iron and steel industries in ten large countries comparing ETS-regulated to 
non-ETS-regulated companies within these industries. Interestingly, they only find statistically 
significant results within the power sector where unit material costs are shown to have increased 
by 5% (Phase I) to 8% (Phase II). At the same time, they demonstrate that revenue has 
increased by a remarkable amount of 30%. Note that this study detects no negative effects on 
competitiveness in the other studied sectors which are very energy-intensive nor does it identify 
employment effects in any of the sectors. For major European power companies, also the returns 
on the stock market appear to be positively correlated with EUA prices (Veith et al., 2009 and 
Bushnell et al., 2013). These results could be an indication of a strong cost pass-through onto 
electricity consumers. At the same time, the results of these two studies have to be treated with 
caution due to their small samples. Yu (2013) analyses a larger sample of Swedish energy firms 
for the first two years of the EU ETS. Applying a differences-in-differences approach to the 
energy industry the study shows no significant impact of the introduction of the EU ETS on 
profitability in 2005 and a negative significant impact in 2006.  
As for the Kyoto Protocol as a whole, Aichele and Felbermayr (2015) demonstrate important 
carbon leakage effects on a more aggregated level. They focus on carbon embodied in trade in 
the framework of a gravity model which they apply to country or industry level data showing that 
some sectors are more prone to carbon leakage than others (also Aichele, Felbermayr, 2012). 
Dechezleprêtre et al. (2014) also employ a rather rough identification strategy in order to analyse 
carbon leakage effects: They compare EU to non-EU companies based on self-reported survey 
data and find no significant carbon leakage from the EU ETS. 
Evaluation studies on market-based environmental policies other than the EU ETS show similarly 
negligible effects (e.g., Pestel, 2014). Two recent studies focusing on Germany employ a 
regression discontinuity design (RDD), thereby comparing firms closely around a policy-relevant 
threshold. Using highly reliable large administrative firm census data for the manufacturing sector, 
they conclude that neither the electricity tax (Flues, Lutz, 2015) nor the Renewable Energy 
Sources Act (Gerster, 2015) exhibit statistically significant effects on firms’ profitability. By 
estimating cross-price elasticities between electricity and heterogeneous labour for the German 
manufacturing sector, Cox et al. (2014) point to weak substitutability between electricity and 
labour when the production level is held constant. This would imply small employment losses due 
to the renewable energy surcharge which are inflicted in particular on medium and highly qualified 
employees. For the UK, the Climate Change Levy (CCL) has been evaluated by Martin et al. 
(2014c) for manufacturing plants, using panel data from the UK production census. While they 
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find a strong negative impact of the CCL regulation on energy intensity and electricity use of 
firms, they find no negative effects on economic performance or on plant exit. 
These findings of small or negligible effects from the EU ETS are surprising given that for other 
international environmental policy schemes substantial effects have been documented. One of 
the most important policies in the US is the Clean Air Act which has triggered a large amount of 
related empirical literature. The early literature often used industry or county-level data finding 
inconclusive results or a zero effect of the Clean Air Act on employment (see Jaffe et al., 1995 for 
an overview). By means of simple panel methods and firm-level data, Greenstone (2002) finds 
significant negative effects of the Clean Air Act amendments on employment, capital stock and 
output in pollution-intensive industries. By means of similar methods, Berman and Bui (2001) 
analyse a particular air quality regulation in the LA air basin and find hardly any employment 
effect of this regulation. If anything, there could be a small positive employment effect. List et al. 
(2003), by contrast, stress the importance of using semi- or non-parametric methods and argue 
that the effects of the regulation may otherwise be biased upwards (also see Henderson, Millimet, 
2007). Deschenes (2012) uses yet another approach by estimating cross elasticities between the 
electricity price and labour, finding weak negative effects of an increased electricity price on 
employment, which he interprets in light of the Clean Air Act. Concerning the effects of the 
stringency of this regulation on other competitiveness-related outcomes, significant negative 
effects have been found for total factor productivity (TFP; Greenstone et al., 2012) and plant 
births (Becker, Henderson, 2000). Meanwhile, the evidence is mixed for location decisions (Kahn, 
Mansur, 2013) and foreign direct investments (FDI; Henderson, Millimet, 2007; List, Co, 2000). 
Statistically significant but economically very small effects have been found for wages as a result 
of job transitions (Walker, 2013). Overall, modern semi-parametric methods generally show much 
weaker effects as compared to simple panel methods.  
It remains an important open question why these international environmental policies display 
negative effects on firms’ competitiveness whereas such negative effects have not been 
documented for the EU ETS? Because of this insight, this present study explores different 
reasons for which there may not be any substantial competitiveness effect from the EU ETS. 
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4. Hypotheses on the question: Why does the EU ETS not significantly affect firms’ 
competitiveness? 
As shown above, the literature finds weak or zero effects of environmental policies on firms’ 
economic performance. These results run counter to traditional concerns saying that 
environmental policies destroy jobs and harm the competitiveness of exporting firms.  This raises 
another question: Why do empirical researchers not detect any significant negative impact of 
market-based instruments on European firms’ competitiveness? We answer this question in the 
framework of the EU ETS by analysing several hypotheses. We discuss them and try to find 
supporting evidence in empirical and theoretical findings. While the following five hypotheses may 
be linked, it is worth discussing their individual particularities and implications in the following. 
4.1  Free allocation  
Hypothesis No. 1: “Free allocation of emissions certificates reduces the cost burden 
of firms, and thus may help reduce negative effects of the EU ETS on 
competitiveness and economic performance.” 
 
When faced with the EU ETS regulation, firms have to either abate emissions or buy certificates. 
Therefore, firms traditionally consider environmental regulation an onerous economic burden, as 
it increases production costs and may have further repercussions on companies’ employment 
level and performance. Three types of costs associated with a trading scheme implementation 
can be distinguished (following Clò, 2010): abatement costs
17
, potentially higher electricity prices 
and the costs of buying certificates. Free allocation saves firms from bearing this last cost, i.e. 
from buying their permits on the carbon market. For this reason free allocation may help 
alleviating the potential negative impact on European plants.  
Since the beginning of the scheme in 2005, free allocation has been the main allocation 
mechanism within the EU ETS. During the first years the cap of certified emissions was also seen 
as an adjustment variable so as to introduce the constraint gradually and to figure out how many 
allowances countries and industries needed. Allocation was applied according to grandfathering: 
emissions certificates were freely distributed according to past emissions. Afterwards, in 
particular since the start of the third trading period, allocation has aimed at protecting 
manufacturing plants that are globally trade-exposed, while energy firms have had to buy their 
permits at auction. In the case of manufacturing, free certificates have been distributed according 
to a benchmark figure and historical production data of installations. Most trade-intensive and 
carbon-intensive sectors have received 100% free permits up to the benchmark (see section 2.) 
Free allocation was the most prevalent and nearly the only method applied between 2005 and 
2012, and to a lesser extent also at the beginning of Phase III. The European Commission 
authorised EU member states to auction a maximum of 5% of their allowances in Phase I and up 
to 10% in the second trading period. Otherwise, free allocation was the default rule. For several 
reasons, such as the fierce opposition of European firms against auctioning, only four 
governments chose to auction or sell a small share of permits in Phase I (Denmark, Hungary, 
Lithuania and Ireland; see Ellerman, Buchner, 2007; Venmans, 2012). In all, auctioning 
accounted for an annual average of 0.13% of certified emissions (Ellerman, Buchner, 2007). In 
Phase II, only seven countries delivered information on auctioned allowances on the website of 
the European Commission.
18
 The National Allocation Plans (NAPs) only envisaged that 3.1% of 
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 For example, firms may buy new equipment so as to adopt an eco-friendly production process and to control their level of 
pollution (Gray, 2015). 
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 DG CLIMA, Phase II auctions (2008-2012),  
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total allowances should be auctioned (Schleich et al., 2007; Venmans, 2012). The decentralised 
nature of the EU ETS apparently has given countries an incentive to allocate free allowances 
generously, as argued by Kruger et al. (2007) and Schmalensee, Stavins (2015). 
We have seen that free allocation was clearly dominant in Phase I and II. The main difference 
between the first two phases and Phase III is that the electricity sector in general now has to buy 
permits at auctions (EU Commission, 2014a; Clò 2010). Manufacturing sectors receive 
allowances partially for free under benchmarking. Still, in 2013, manufacturing industries not 
classified at risk of carbon leakage received on average 80% of permits for free up to the 
benchmark.
19
 This share is supposed to decrease smoothly to 30% by 2020. As for sectors 
“deemed at risk of carbon leakage” they receive 100% free allowances up to benchmark during 
the entire Phase III and thereafter, as long as they stay on the carbon leakage list.
20
 154 out of 
258 NACE-4 sectors belong to this list, representing 85% (Martin et al., 2014a) up to 95% (de 
Bruyn et al., 2013) of CO2 emissions from manufacturing. Overall, free allocation represents 43% 
of the total amount of certificates of Phase III (2013-2020).
21
 
Should it be of concern that a large share of emissions certificates is allocated for free? This 
allocation method is challenged by some economists (e.g. Cramton, Kerr, 2002; Hepburn et al., 
2006) who prefer auctioning. Free allocation may not reflect marginal abatement costs and thus 
create competitive distortions. Moreover, free allocation is often referred to as a subsidy in the 
literature (Jegou, Rubini, 2011; Neuhoff et al., 2006; Böhringer, Lange, 2005). In addition – 
depending on the allocation mechanism – free allocation could influenced by pressure from 
individual companies or other interest groups more heavily than auctioning. When combined with 
cost pass-through, free allocation may increase firms’ profitability (see hypothesis no. 3). 
Auctioning could be more environmentally effective than free allocation because its positive price 
may induce greater investment in low-carbon technologies (Milliman and Prince, 1989, 1992; 
Cramton and Kerr, 2002, p.2). Still, under free allocation the opportunity costs of the emission 
certificates remain, thus generating incentives for abatement and investment signals (Requate 
and Unold, 2003). In particular, comparing free allocation and auctioning with identical caps, the 
difference between both allocation mechanisms is a distributional matter. As far as we know, no 
empirical ex post evidence stating that free allocation enables better economic performance than 
auctioning has been provided so far. Therefore, we leave this topic to future research. In 
conclusion, it is difficult to attribute the large amount of free allocation causally to the empirical 
findings which show no negative effects of the EU ETS scheme. Still, we have seen that this 
allocation method has prevailed by far since 2005. This result is important to remember for the 
subsequent two hypotheses which will be over-allocation and cost pass-through.  
 
                                                     
19
 DG CLIMA, Free allocation based on benchmarks  
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/allocation/index_en.htm, last retrieved 11/08/2016 
20
 Sectors deemed at risk of carbon leakage by the European Commission are defined in an official list  (see paragraph 
« Carbon leakage list », DG CLIMA, Carbon Leakage http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/allowances/leakage/index_en.htm, 
last retrieved 17/08/16) 
21
 DG CLIMA, Free Allocation 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/allowances/index_en.htm, last retrieved 11/08/2016 
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4.2 Over-allocation  
Hypothesis No. 2: “An over-allocation of allowances to regulated firms has occurred 
and has largely eased the compliance constraint on these firms. Therefore, we may 
not find negative effects of the EU ETS on firms’ competitiveness and economic 
performance.” 
To what extent has over-allocation been taking place since the implementation of the EU ETS? 
Over-allocation would mean that the majority of the ETS firms have many more allowances than 
needed. Under auctioning over-allocation could be lower than under free allocation, as rational 
firms only buy as many permits as they need. However, depending on uncertainty and price 
expectations, there may also exist substantial over-allocation under auctioning. There is a strong 
indication for over-allocation of allowances in the EU ETS as we are showing step by step for all 
three trading phases. 
Note that over-allocation is conceptually different from being long
22
 (Ellerman, Buchner, 2008). In 
this paper we also consider a large-scale long position to be of interest, as it would represent a 
lightened burden for regulated firms.  
I. Over-allocation in the first trading period (2005-2007) 
The first trading period was considered a trial period and of all three trading periods so far, it is 
the one for which we have most empirical evidence available. There has been an excess of 
allowances at least during the first two years (Grubb et al., 2005). In 2005 the whole market was 
long with 95 million tonnes CO2, corresponding to 4.5% of the allocated allowances
23
 (Kettner et 
al., 2008). This average percentage hides disparities between Member States, sectors and 
individual firms. On the aggregate level of Member States, Lithuania exhibits the most 
pronounced long position with over 100% more allowances than needed (Anger, Oberndorfer, 
2008). Ireland and the UK show the most pronounced short position with about 20% less 
allowances than needed (ibid.).  
Figure 2: Positions by European sectors in 2005 
As for disparities between 
sectors, Kettner et al. (2008) 
show that all sectors were long in 
2005 except the power and heat 
sector (figure 2). The oversupply 
is particularly high for the pulp 
and paper as well as for the iron 
and steel sector. Some large 
companies belonging to these 
sectors were referred to as 
“carbon fat cats” by Morris and 
Worthington (2011), i.e. heavily 
over-allocated companies. 
                                                     
22 
A long position corresponds to the state of having more permits than needed. In a trading scheme, it is normal that some firms 
are long and others short, as installations have different marginal costs of abatement. Accordingly some chose to abate 
(become long) and other to emit and buy permits (become short). Economic conditions also play a role as firms producing less 
will need fewer allowances than expected. In contrast, over-allocation is the consequence of a misallocation (too many permits 
are allocated). It results in an excessively long position covering the whole market.  It results in an excessively long position 
covering the whole market. This requires estimating a plausible business as usual (BAU) scenario for comparison (Ellerman, 
Buchner, 2008). 
23
 These figures are based on installations for which data were available for both allocated EUAs and verified emissions for 
2005 and 2006, see Kettner et al. (2008). 
Source: Data: CITL, National Allocation Plans and List of Installations; Graph 
from Kettner et al. (2008), p. 53. 
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By contrast, the power sector is the only one that used more allowances than it received for free 
during the first two phases (Abrell et al., 2011). It was short by about 3% in 2005 (Ellerman, 
Buchner, 2008). The power sector is assumed to be hardly trade-exposed and governments 
believed that potential abatement was larger (Kettner et al., 2008), most likely due to its large 
volume of emissions. Therefore, most EU-15
24
 countries provided a short allocation of EUAs to 
the electricity utility sector (Ellerman, Buchner, 2007). Kolshus and Torvanger (2005) indicate that 
sectors competing internationally were advantaged in terms of allocation.
25
 
Behind the aggregated statistics on the country or sector level, on the individual firm level most 
firms are long but a few are short (see Kettner et al., 2008). On a more disaggregated level, there 
are also disparities between individual installations as Anger and Oberndorfer (2008) emphasise. 
Indeed, they reveal strong variations of the allocation factor between firms. Kettner et al. (2008) 
add distorting distributional impacts among installations according to their size. While small
26
 
plants tend to have a long position but with a high dispersion, large plants tend to be short, 
however with a smaller dispersion (ibid.). Possibly, the heterogeneity in long positions described 
here is linked to the effect heterogeneity with respect to firm size that the ex-post literature 
observes (Abrell et al., 2011; Chan et al., 2013; Martin et al. 2014a).
27
 Moreover, the initial 
allocation of allowances is highly relevant for emissions reduction because firms that are short cut 
emissions to a greater extent than long firms and vice versa (Abrell et al., 2011). 
Figure 3: Evolution of the spot price of EUAs (2005-2012) 
In April 2006, one after another, 
most of the EU members 
revealed long positions 
regarding EUAs, until the EU 
Commission released the 
complete version of verified 
emissions on May 15, 2006. It 
showed that in 2005 the whole 
market was long with 95 million 
tonnes CO2 (Kettner et al., 
2008). As prices reflect 
available information, the 
disclosures were swiftly 
followed by a sharp collapse of 
the EUA prices (see figure 3).  
 
The EUA price was considered too low to exploit a large abatement potential by Kettner et al. 
(2008). At the same time, a low-carbon price reduces costs for those sectors or installations who 
are short. Note that the carbon price may still be significantly positive despite over-allocation, in 
                                                     
24
 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the UK. 
25
 For example, Czech “exposed sectors” received about 32% more than their past emissions while “non-exposed” sectors 
received only 3.5 %. Note that both got less than their BAU emissions. Kolshus and Torvanger (2005) define two aggregate 
groups of sectors as follows: 
Exposed sectors: refineries, iron and steel, cement, glass, line, ceramics, pulp and paper and others. 
Non-exposed sectors: electricity, district heating, energy, combined heat power, power, heat, cogeneration, steam. 
26
 Small installations account for 5% of emissions in total, whereas the largest installations are responsible for 50% of emissions 
(Kettner et al., 2008) 
27
 In addition, Heindl (forthcoming) documents that costs for monitoring, reporting and verification of emissions (MRV) are 
proportionally higher for small than for large firms. 
Source: Civitelli (2016), p.11. 
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case participants do not know about the over-allocation, or expect a higher stringency in the 
future.
28
 
Next, we discuss whether this overall long position can be attributed to over-allocation (see 
footnote 22). Some authors find evidence of over-allocation and abatement at the same time 
(Ellerman, Buchner, 2008; Anderson, Di Maria, 2011). While this may sound counterintuitive, the 
authors argue that the two may co-exist, as abatement is linked to the CO2 price and not to 
allocation.
29
  To gauge the extent of over-allocation for the years 2005-2006, Ellerman and 
Buchner (2008) estimate a BAU scenario and propose a measure of allocation which uses past 
and verified emissions. Their thorough inquiry suggests that over-allocation might have reached a 
maximum of 125 million EUAs in 2005-2006. According to them, this length cannot be attributed 
to abatement or unexpected conditions. Moreover, they demonstrate that firms did abate 
emissions by between 50 and 100 million tonnes each year. The results by Ellerman et al. (2010, 
estimating 70Mt per year) and Anderson and Di Maria (2011) are well within that range. The latter 
estimate net abatement in 2005, 2006 and 2007 to be of around 84, 62, and 28 Mt CO2 
respectively, following the declining trend of the EUA prices. Ellerman and Buchner (2008) 
underline that over-allocation could have its roots either in an under-estimation of abatement or 
an over-estimation of emissions ex ante. 
II. Over-allocation in the second trading period (2008-2012) 
The second trading period was characterised by a fierce economic downturn. In consequence, 
there was once more a large excess of unused allowances as indicated by DG CLIMA (2013).
30
 
Due to the scarcity of studies focussing on the oversupply of allowances in the second trading 
period of the EU ETS, we use prices as an indicator. In fact, a low carbon price should reflect 
oversupply and vice versa. 
Figure 4: EUA and CER price from January 2008 to November 2012. 
Figure 4 depicts EUA and 
Certified Emissions 
Reduction (CER) prices 
(from Haita, 2013). The 
price decrease started 
with the European 
Commission’s release, 
indicating that 2008 
verified emissions were 
3% below the 2007 
level.
31
  A first drop 
followed right after and 
may be largely explained 
by the 2008 financial 
crisis (Haita, 2013).  
Although the economic downturn seems to have initiated the bearish trend, there may be many 
other reasons for its continuing decline such as the overlapping of different climate policies or the 
                                                     
28
 Another argument for a positive EUA price despite over-allocation is provided by banking. This was, however, not relevant in 
the first trading period.  
29
 „In a trading system, it is not the allocation to an installation that causes a firm to reduce emissions, but the price that it must 
pay, even if in opportunity cost, for its emissions“ Ellerman and Buchner (2008), p. 286. 
30
 EU ETS factsheet, European Union, October 2013, p.4 “2
nd
 trading period. [H]the economic downturn cuts emissions, and 
thus demand, by even more. This leads to a surplus of unused allowances and credits which weighs on carbon price.” 
Available at http://ec.europa.eu/clima/publications/docs/factsheet_ets_en.pdf, last retrieved 11/08/2016. 
31
 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-09-794_en.htm?locale=en, last retrieved 11/08/2016. 
Source: Haita (2013), p. 2. 
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mild weather of the period (Haita, 2013). We also observe that the CER price is starting to 
decouple with the EUA price, making it cheaper for firms to buy carbon offset credits than 
permits. This could exacerbate the oversupply of EUAs. Due to the economic crisis, all BAU 
estimations constructed before became out-dated making it hard to pinpoint over-allocation as 
opposed to a long position. 
What is important is the substantial oversupply of EUAs along with the possibility of banking 
these unused allowances to the third trading period. In fact, it can be rational for firms to bank 
emission allowances to future periods in order to minimise abatement costs over time (Ellerman 
et al., 2015). Morris (2011) reveals that 77% of EU ETS installations had a long position in EUAs 
in 2011. He estimates the surplus of allowances to have reached 855Mt CO2 in 2011, of which 
672 Mt CO2 would be saved for Phase III. In early 2012, the accumulated surplus accounted for 
955 million allowances, i.e. 406 million allowances when excluding international credits
32
 for 
compliance (EU Commission, 2012). At the end of 2013, the overcapacity reached 2 billion 
allowances (Carbon Market Watch, 2014). This shows that banking entails the risk of extending a 
surplus of allowances to the subsequent period.  
III. Over-allocation in the third trading period (2013-2020) 
The third trading phase of the EU ETS is still on-going so we cannot provide final results 
regarding over-allocation or oversupply for this period. Moreover, we are not aware of any ex post 
empirical evidence on competitiveness effects during this period. Still, we document what we 
know so far and reason why this period could be similar to the previous ones, in spite of the 
Commission’s attempt to make it more stringent.  
Figure 5: The build-up of surplus in EU ETS by 2020 
As expected, the allowance 
surplus of Phase II was banked 
into Phase III, which now has to 
deal with a massive surplus of 2.1 
billion permits (figure 5; Carbon 
Market Watch, 2014). This surplus 
is expected to increase to 2.6 
billion by 2020. According to the 
authors, this excess is further 
increased by the possibility of 
using international credit offsets, 
whose price was close to €0 in 
2014 and thus lower than the 
permit price (around 5€) during 
the same period.  
 
As we observe in figure 6, both prices (CER and EUA) are low, with the CER price close to 0€. 
When CERs are cheaper than EUAs, installations rather opt for the CER option (purchase 
international offset credits). This frees up their EUAs (either bought or received for free) which 
they can shift to Phase IV (2021-2030) or sell on the carbon market and thus achieve windfall 
profits. As a consequence, the EUA supply increases and its price falls. Even if the practice of 
buying CERs was limited at 1.6 billion CERs for Phase II and III by the Commission (Carbon 
                                                     
32
 “An international credit that is used for compliance frees up one allowance that does not need to be used for compliance. As 
such the use of international credits for compliance increases the surplus of allowances available to the market” EU Commission 
(2012). 
Source: Carbon Market Watch (2014), p. 4. 
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Market Watch, 2014), it would still have significant consequences on the carbon market, as it is 
responsible for more than half of the expected 2020 EUA surplus (see figure 5). Note that the 
carbon price is far from reaching the price reference of 30 euros that the Commission employed 
for calculating which sectors are exposed to carbon leakage risk.  
Figure 6: EU Emission Allowances and Certified Emissions Reductions Prices (Jan 2013-Aug 
2016) 
 
An important characteristic of the third trading period is the application of exemption rules to 
sectors with a high risk of relocation. This may lead to an overcompensation of these sectors 
deemed at risk (Martin et al., 2014a). Martin et al. (2014a) show that for many firms, the 
propensity to relocate does not fluctuate with the amount of free certificates. In turn, this finding 
implies that these firms are overcompensated with free permits (Martin et al., 2014a). In addition, 
Martin et al. (2014b) show that the trade intensity criterion alone has not been well-suited for 
reflecting the carbon leakage risk and that only carbon intensity constitutes a good proxy. 
However, 134 out of 140 exempted NACE-4 sectors are exempted for the reason that they are 
trade-exposed while not appearing to be carbon intensive at all (Clò, 2010; see also Martin et al., 
2014a,b). These results point to overcompensation if the aim of the exemption rules is to reduce 
the risk of relocation.  
Summing up, we have documented a substantial surplus of emission allowances for all three 
trading phases. This carries three implications: First, plants that have a surplus of allowances 
could ignore abatement options but they have an incentive to reduce their emissions in order to 
sell the remaining certificates. Second, these firms could sell their excess of permits and thus 
increase their profitability (“windfall profits”
33
). Third, as oversupply causes prices to fall, other 
firms could benefit from cheap allowances on the carbon market. In addition, the low price of 
emission certificates reduces the scope of feasible abatement options to only the cheapest ones. 
These three circumstances may be the reason for not finding harmful effects of the trading 
scheme on competitiveness.  
                                                     
33
 We define windfall profits as an increasing profitability that can be explained by participation in the EU ETS, either through 
selling an allowance surplus or by passing through opportunity costs of the free allowances to consumers (also see hypothesis 
no. 3).  
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Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream, own graph. 
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4.3 Cost pass-through 
Hypothesis No. 3: “When firms can pass-through costs to consumers they may 
earn profits from freely allocated emissions certificates. This may explain not finding 
negative effects of the EU ETS on firms’ economic performance.” 
 
When firms have the ability to pass ETS costs on to consumers, windfall profits may occur. This 
may happen if either one of the following two conditions is fulfilled: On the one hand, if there is 
free allocation of emissions certificates and firms use marginal pricing to pass on the opportunity 
cost of the certificates to consumers. On the other hand, windfall profits may occur under 
auctioning in case the pass-through rate is higher than 100%, i.e. the pass-through 
overcompensates for the purchase of the certificates (Sijm et al., 2011). Theory suggests that 
firms integrate the opportunity costs and the auction costs in like manner. Thus, in both cases, 
the price increase for consumers should be the same (Sorrel, Sijm, 2003; Klemperer, 2008; 
Fabra, Reguant, 2014). 
The pass-through rate as well as the potential of increasing profitability depends on the market 
structure, namely on the number of competitors as well as on the demand and supply price 
elasticity (for details see Sijm et al., 2009). Theory suggests that when demand becomes less 
price responsive (inelastic) or the market becomes less competitive, the pass-through rate 
increases, potentially above 100%. Alternatively, a full pass-through rate (100%) is also expected 
in the case of perfect competition, when supply is fully elastic and the demand function linear 
(Sijm et al., 2011). Indeed, prices reflect marginal costs under full competition. We assume that if 
all firms are subject to these rising costs, none of them will lose competitiveness relative to 
others. Otherwise, price distortions may arise and regulated firms could lose market shares 
(Alexeeva-Talebi, 2010). Accordingly, the decision of fully passing through costs relies on 
strategic behaviour (short-term earnings versus long-term market share loss). To avoid losing 
customers in the long-run, firms may cut profit margins when possible, or they may relocate. 
Firms as rational profit-maximisers only pass-through costs as long as profits outweigh potential 
losses (de Bruyn et al., 2010a). Alexeeva-Talebi (2010) demonstrates that products’ 
substitutability also plays its part in determining the PTR. In the same context of linear demand 
and constant marginal costs, a monopoly is expected to pass-through only 50% of costs. But its 
powerful position guarantees the monopolist a rent without losing clients. In addition, the literature 
identifies price rigidities as another potential source of incompleteness of passing through costs 
(Fabra, Reguant, 2014). 
We now study the case of the power sector. Recall that Chan et al. (2013) find significant effects 
on increasing unit material cost and total revenues for the power sector in ten European 
countries, even though the sector was short as a whole. The authors conclude by saying that 
“both findings could reflect utilities passing the cost (from compliance) to consumers” (ibid, p. 
1061).  
The energy sector is a special case with respect to cost pass-through ability and market structure 
for two main reasons. First, electricity distribution is based on a national grid structure which 
prevents most international companies from competing (Clò, 2010). Therefore, many power firms 
used to have a historical monopoly in delivering electricity. This situation confers utilities a strong 
market position, especially on retail markets (Veith, 2009; EU Commission, 2011). Second, 
demand for electricity is highly price inelastic where price elasticity is usually lower for households 
than for the industry (Fan, Hyndman, 2011; Filippini, Pachauria, 2004; Filippini, 1999). In addition, 
low price rigidity facilitates the full pass-through of marginal costs. This is due to the organisation 
of electricity markets in the form of an auction. Due to its high market concentration and low price 
elasticity, the power sector is well-fitted for cost pass-through.  
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We now show empirical evidence of substantial pass-through rates (PTR) in the power sector. 
Fabra and Reguant (2013) study the Spanish electricity wholesale market at the beginning of the 
EU ETS (2004-2006). They find that carbon costs were almost fully transferred to final prices with 
an average PTR of 80%. Sijm et al. (2006) calculate empirical pass-through rates of between 
60% and 117% for 2005 for Germany. When studying the power sector in the Netherlands, they 
find the pass-through rate to vary between 64% and 81%. Both studies demonstrate a higher 
PTR during high demand hours (on-peak hours). Furthermore, Fabra and Reguant (2013) reason 
that price changes only reflect changes in marginal costs. Another indication for windfall profits 
due to high pass-through rates in the power sector is the positive evaluation of increasing EUA 
prices on the stock market (Bushnell et al., 2013; Veith et al., 2009; Oberndorfer, 2009). These 
studies reveal that financial markets expect firms to pass compliance costs through and expect 
power generators to benefit from the regulation. The only exception is Spain as it experiences a 
negative EUA-to-stock relationship (Oberndorfer, 2009).  
The electricity sector is found to not only pass-through opportunity costs, but it may on top benefit 
from an asymmetric cost pass-through (Zachmann and von Hirschhausen, 2008; Oberndorfer et 
al., 2010). Thus, producers may largely benefit from increased prices. Zachmann and von 
Hirschhausen (2008) as well as Mokinski and Wölfing (2014) provide evidence of an asymmetric 
cost pass-through of EUA costs in the German wholesale electricity market. The latter suggest 
that this asymmetry was the consequence of non-competitive pricing behaviour, as it disappeared 
after the competition authority decided to monitor electricity pricing. In contrast to these two 
studies, Oberndorfer (2009) shows that the European stock market does react symmetrically to 
the EAU price movement. They consider two possible explanations: either the German case 
might not be well comparable to other European countries or stock markets’ agents might not be 
aware that prices are passed on asymmetrically.    
Summing up, we find a strong indication of a very high cost pass-through rate in the power sector 
which implies windfall profits, at least for Phase I and II of the EU ETS when emissions 
certificates were almost fully allocated for free. More precisely, for Phase I, windfall profits for the 
UK power generation sector were estimated to reach about £800m/year (WWF, 2005). For Phase 
II, windfall profits of the European power sector were estimated to range between 23 and 63 
billion euros, based on a carbon price of 21 to 32 €/t CO2 and different pass-through assumptions 
(WWF, 2008). As for the third trading phase, the power sector now has to buy emissions 
certificates via auctioning, with the exception of power industries located in eight countries 
(Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Romania, Hungary, Poland, and Latvia).
34
 The 
introduction of auctioning may reduce windfall profits in the power sector. Finally, note that public 
authorities may intervene to limit cost pass-through. For example the French government 
increased regulatory interventions to restrict the price increase of Electricité De France (Laing et 
al., 2013; Le Figaro, 2015
35
). 
In contrast to the power sector, many manufacturing industries may be more exposed to 
competition. Therefore, manufacturing industries may be at risk if they increase output prices 
compared to non-EU competitors that are not facing a comparable CO2 regulation. Therefore we 
will next discuss the manufacturing sector.  
                                                     
34
 CDC Climat, Climate Brief n°25 „Auction Revenues in EU ETS Phase 3: A new public resource“, January 2013. 
35
 Le Figaro, 15/07/2015, « Les tarifs d'EDF pourraient bondir de 3,5% à 8% »  
http://www.lefigaro.fr/conso/2015/07/15/05007-20150715ARTFIG00181-les-tarifs-d-edf-pourraient-bondir-de-35-a-8.php, last 
retrieved 11/08/2016 
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Figure 7: Manufacturing sectors split according to  
trade and carbon intensity
36
 
Figure 7 represents European manu-
facturing sectors divided according to their 
trade and carbon intensity (Martin et al., 
2014b). Sectors deemed at risk by the EU 
Commission correspond to categories A, 
B and C. While a few seem to be carbon-
intensive (A), more seem predominantly 
trade-exposed (category B). These latter 
sectors are internationally trade-exposed, 
i.e. exposed to competition from non ETS-
regulated companies. Therefore, we do 
not expect them to be able to increase 
final output prices considerably, as this 
would risk losing market shares against 
foreign competitors. Fierce competition 
with foreign competitors may reduce the domestic pass-through potential. Instead of passing-
through the costs of the EU ETS, companies may have to decrease profit margins, if possible, or 
may decide to relocate (Alexeeva-Talebi, 2010). Following neoclassical theories that consider 
firms as rational profit-maximisers, we assume that observing a positive PTR provides evidence 
of windfall profits if permits are allocated for free. Indeed, firms increase prices as long as profits 
are higher than losses (de Bruyn et al., 2010a). 
First, we study the case of the refining industry which has been largely investigated (Alexeeva-
Talebi, 2011; De Bruyn et al., 2010a; Oberndorfer et al., 2010). On the basis of country-level data 
of 14 EU Member States for Phase I of the EU ETS, Alexeeva-Talebi (2011) finds long-run 
elasticities of petrol prices with respect to EUA prices to vary between 0.01 and 0.09 across 
countries. According to the author, these numbers match the share of EUA costs in the 
production costs of refineries, estimated at roughly 2%, fairly well, implying a full pass-through 
rate, i.e. of 100% cost pass-through. The same conclusion is reached by de Bruyn et al. (2010a) 
who compare international prices for gasoline, diesel and gasoil. By contrast, Oberndorfer et al. 
(2010) estimate the PTR of UK refineries to amount to only 50% for diesel products and 75% for 
gasoline in 2005-2006, without evidence of asymmetric pricing. In parallel with these findings, we 
have seen that the European refining sector had on average a long position in 2005 (Kettner et 
al., 2008) with variations across countries (Alexeeva-Talebi, 2011). Overall, European refineries 
appear to have benefited from windfall profits in the first trading period, be it for passing through 
the opportunity costs of EUAs or for selling their allowance surplus.  
Another important sector within manufacturing is the iron and steel industry (basic metals). It is 
described as an oligopoly by de Bruyn et al. (2010a), so that firms within this sector can decide 
on the product price to a certain extent. The authors show evidence that these industries pass 
costs fully through, when studying EU prices between 2001 and 2009. This result runs counter to 
Fitz Gerald et al. (2009), who find basic-minerals to be price-takers and very vulnerable to foreign 
prices. De Bruyn et al. (2010a) conclude that this sector may have achieved substantial profits 
during Phase I and II, as a result of free allocation combined with a full PTR. They estimate that 
refineries as well as iron and steel industries may have earned up to €14 billion of profits in total 
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 The size of the circles is proportional to the number of firms in a given industry (Martin et al., 2014b, p. 81). 
Source: Martin et al. (2014b), p.81. 
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between 2005 and 2008, by fully passing through.
37,38
 Moreover, the iron and steel sector is often 
referred to as a “carbon fat cat” (Morris, Worthington, 2010; Elsworth et al., 2011), meaning that it 
receives a substantial amount of allowances at no cost. In 2011, the ten most emitting iron and 
steel companies had a surplus of 172 million allowances that is estimated to represent €2.9 billion 
(Elsworth et al., 2011).  
The non-mineral branches are expected to pass-through the carbon costs according to Fitz 
Gerald et al. (2009). Alexeeva-Talebi (2010) estimates the long-run PTR of production costs of 
German sub-sectors belonging to non-metallic minerals branches (hollow glass, glass fibres, 
other glass, cement lime and plaster), while taking into account trade exposure. The analysis, 
based on data from 1995 to 2008, reveals that PTRs vary between 24% (other glass) and >60% 
(hollow glass). Oberndorfer et al. (2010) find PTRs for the UK glass industry to be 0% (container 
glass) and 20-25% (hollow glass). Furthermore, the PTR is up to 40% for ceramic bricks and 
higher than 100% for ceramic goods (ibid.). Moreover, the ceramic good industry exhibits an 
asymmetric pricing behaviour. Both studies rely on the assumption that passing through input 
costs is a good proxy of carbon costs pass-through. With the exception of ceramic goods, these 
studies do not support high market power in setting prices and this way contrast with the results 
of Fitz Gerald et al. (2009). 
Within the chemical industry, the production processes are very heterogeneous as de Bruyn et al. 
(2010a) argue. Therefore, impacts of regulation may widely vary within this sector. Oberndorfer et 
al. (2010a) study how the chemical industry is able to pass-through an input price increase on 
final prices of selected products between 2001 and 2007. They find PTRs of 50% (ammonium 
nitrate) and 100% (low density polyethylene), when using data from the UK industry and 
European data when available. De Bruyn et al. (2010a) find the PTR of chemicals to vary from 
33% to 100% across selected products.
39
 However, they are concerned that it may be the result 
of the cost pass-through of refineries and inorganic chemicals (suppliers). Accordingly, the 
studied chemical industries themselves may not benefit from increased prices. For Germany, 
Alexeeva-Talebi (2010) finds long-run PTRs to vary between 0% (perfumes and toilet 
preparation) and 42% (manufacture of plastics in primary forms).  
As for other branches, there are only a few empirical results to the best of our knowledge. 
According to Alexeeva-Talebi (2010), long-term PTRs in Germany vary between 0% (paper and 
paper-board) and 75% (other rubber products). She emphasises that within manufacturing 
industries the PTRs vary strongly across sectors as well as between sub-sectors. 
For manufacturing as a whole, there is additional direct evidence of increasing profits in addition 
to the evidence of cost pass-through. Bushnell et al. (2013) study the impact of the 2006 carbon 
price crash on stock prices of manufacturing industries and show that the dirtiest industries
40
 
experienced the largest negative effect on stock returns. They interpret this positive correlation 
between carbon price and stock prices as evidence that the EU ETS increases profitability 
because investors perceive the ETS as providing profits to some manufacturing industries. The 
magnitude of the correlation is for some industries even higher than for the electricity and gas 
sectors (ranked 10
th
).  
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 „if we would apply the here discovered full cost-pass-through rates to all products in the refineries and iron and steel sectors, 
it can be calculated that the total amount of windfall profits would equal €14 billion between 2005 and 2008.” De Bruyn (2010a, 
p.60) 
38
 Similarly, Demailly and Quirion (2008) find no competitiveness losses for the iron and steel sector based on a partial 
equilibrium model.  
39
 Polyethylene, polystyrene, polyvinylchloride  
40
 The 5 industries most affected by the price crash in terms of equity prices are: coal and lignite mining, crude petroleum 
extraction, basic metals, sewage and refuse and water transport. 
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Summing up, we have found evidence to suggest that the power sector is able to pass its costs 
on to customers with substantial rates while being sheltered from international competition. This 
supports our hypothesis that a high PTR coupled with free allocation to the power sector is very 
likely to explain why we do not find negative effects of the EU ETS in this sector during the first 
and second trading periods (e.g. Chan et al., 2013). Importantly, rising electricity prices can have 
indirect effects in the other sectors of the economy. In case regulated and non-regulated 
industries in manufacturing were equally affected by rising electricity prices, this could explain not 
finding significant differences between these two groups – at least not for this indirect channel. 
Regarding the manufacturing sector, results vary strongly across industries and sub-industries. 
Therefore, our conclusion is more nuanced. Some industries could pass-through the carbon 
costs, and were even over-allocated at the same time, so that they could achieve windfall profits 
through both channels. In this regard, we assume that cost pass-through holds for certain 
industries (e.g. refining and iron and steel) while it does not for others (e.g. some sub-industries 
from the chemical and from the pulp and paper industry).  
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4.4  Low share of energy costs  
 
Hypothesis No. 4: “Energy costs represent a small share in firms’ overall production 
costs. Therefore, an increase in energy costs as posited by the EU ETS is 
economically irrelevant to firms.” 
 
We show that this hypothesis holds on average, namely, energy cost shares are low in the 
aggregate. However, there are heterogeneities across sectors, with some being more exposed to 
energy cost increases.  
Above all, energy cost shares in total costs are low compared to other inputs – at least on 
average. The European Commission estimates that energy costs made up a cost share of 4.6% 
in total production within the EU-27 in 2011 (figure 8).
41
 These estimates are based on data from 
the World Input-Output Database and the International Energy Agency and calculate the energy 
cost share in basic prices
42
 as a percentage of gross output. Further empirical evidence shows 
that, for example, in the German industry as a whole, the share of energy costs in gross value 
added amounted to about 5% (Thamling et al. 2010) to 8% in 2009 (BDEW, 2014). Similarly, in 
France, energy cost shares in production value have been shown to be lower and relatively 
modest as compared to the cost of wages for French manufacturing industries (Bureau et al., 
2013). These different pieces of empirical evidence show that energy cost shares are low 
compared to other production inputs when considering averages over industries.  
Figure 8: Energy cost shares in basic prices (in % of gross output) 
 
Source: European Competitiveness Report (2014) p. 194 
In fact, not only is the share of energy costs low in European manufacturing industries, but it is on 
average even lower than the one Europe’s main competitors face. The European Commission 
finds the mean share of energy costs in gross output to be lower in the EU-27 as compared to 
China, Japan and the US (figure 8). While the energy cost share added up to 7.5% in European 
manufacturing industries in 2011, it amounted to 11.3% in the US. When removing coke, refined 
petroleum and nuclear fuel (sector NACE no. 23), this percentage decreases to 3.0%, and is still 
among the lowest. In addition, the increase in the energy cost share over time appears to have 
been slower in Europe than in its main competitor countries. This suggests that European manu-
facturing seems to perform well in terms of competitiveness relative to its major competitors on 
average. Alternatively, this trend could be an outcome of the regulation in case energy intense 
firms move outside the EU. However, these aggregated numbers are not sufficient to judge 
whether this dynamic behaviour has indeed taken place and we are not aware of more detailed 
analyses. 
Furthermore, the European Commission empirically analyses the relationship between the energy 
cost share and exports on the 2-digit industry level in 21 EU countries (European 
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 Chapter 6, section 2, of the annual European Competitiveness Report (2014) is devoted to this topic. 
42
 Excluding taxes and margin. 
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Competitiveness Report 2014, p. 203 f.). According to their results, a one percentage point 
increase in the energy cost share goes along with a 0.8% reduction in exports. For energy-
intensive industries, this relation is not statistically significant. Considering the fact that a one 
percentage point increase is larger than what has been observed on average for the EU-27 for 
the period from 1995 or from 2000 to 2011 (excluding coke), this correlation seems negligible. 
It is, however, important to turn away from looking at average numbers to considering the 
heterogeneities across sectors as they may differ substantially (figure 9). Data provided by the 
European Union show that energy cost shares are low in many manufacturing industries but 
stand out in very few others. As hinted at before, the manufacturing of coke, refined petroleum 
and nuclear fuel stands out as the sector with by far the highest energy cost shares.  
Furthermore, chemicals and chemical products and other non-metallic mineral products also 
display relatively high energy cost shares. Still, for these two sectors the energy cost shares were 
well below 8% in the European Union in 2011 (Figure 9). Again, the energy cost shares are 
usually lower in European industries compared to competing non-European industries. 
Figure 9: Energy cost shares by manufacturing industry in basic prices (in % of gross output) 
 
Source:  European Competitiveness Report (2014), p. 195. 
Taking a closer look at the coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel sector, we find a large energy 
cost share (62% of its gross output in 2011, see figure 9). Therefore, it may be more exposed to 
energy cost increases (e.g. exposure to the EU ETS), while other sectors may only experience a 
very moderate impact. However, when looking at emission allowance costs, we find that they also 
represent a very modest share of the total production costs of the European refining industry 
(Alexeeva-Talebi, 2011). Alexeeva-Talebi estimates it to be about 2%. To obtain this result, she 
uses net-of-taxes nominal retail prices (roughly 550€/1000L) and a carbon price reference of 
€20/t of CO2. On top, this sector is on the carbon leakage list, i.e. it benefits from free allocation. 
In conclusion, energy cost shares appear rather low for most industries when considering 
aggregate values. However, this may hide a more unequal distribution on the individual firm level. 
In particular, there is an indication that transaction costs (internal costs, capital costs, consultancy 
and trading costs; see Jaraite et al., 2010), as well as costs for monitoring, reporting and 
verification of emissions (MRV; see Heindl, forthcoming) in the EU ETS vary strongly across firm 
size in a way that affects small and medium sized firms most seriously. At the same time, small 
and medium sized enterprises tend to be less energy intensive and could display energy cost 
shares below average. Hence, firm size differences need to be further investigated. Still, for the 
average firm, energy costs and their increases due to the EU ETS are small but it is crucial to 
investigate more about their distribution across firms to learn about competitiveness impacts. 
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4.5 Innovation 
Hypothesis No. 5 “The EU ETS may cause firms to become more competitive 
through increased innovation. Some evidence about the Porter Hypothesis.” 
Can the EU ETS induce innovation in such a way that it overcompensates otherwise negative 
competitiveness effects? If the innovation channel was very strong it might explain not finding 
negative competitiveness effects. This is what we study next. 
According to the seminal Porter Hypothesis, “properly designed environmental standards can 
trigger innovation that may partially or more than fully offset the costs of complying with them” 
(Porter and van der Linde, 1995, p.98; also see Porter, 1996). The starting point of this theory is 
that pollution often stems from an inefficient use of resources, leading to their waste. 
Environmental regulation can limit resource misuse and enhance resource productivity (Ambec et 
al., 2013). Hence, clean innovation and thus improved productivity can offer an absolute 
advantage over non-regulated competitors.  
Innovation and investment in low-carbon technologies represent one key objective of the EU ETS 
in order to influence long-term abatement and create a sustainable low-carbon path (Pizer and 
Popp, 2008; Calel and Dechezleprêtre, 2016; Martin et al., 2012). In addition, there may be a first 
mover advantage for “green” technologies (Fankhauser et al., 2013; Oberndorfer, Rennings, 
2006; Beise, Rennings, 2005). For these reasons, the EU ETS intends sending a clear and strong 
signal to firms for developing green technologies and, in consequence, we would expect a 
positive effect on firms’ economic performance. 
Porter and van der Linde (1995) emphasize that green policies need to be “well-crafted” and 
stringent enough to induce innovative investments. There are different methodological challenges 
in measuring the stringency of a policy (Johnstone, Kalamova, 2010; Botta and Kozluk, 2014). In 
the context of the EU ETS, we suggest that the emissions reduction target and the permit price 
may represent good estimates for the scheme’s stringency. 
There is a large amount of literature on the innovation effects of environmental policies in general 
(Jaffe and Palmer, 1997; Brunnermeier, Cohen, 2003; Gagelmann, Frondel, 2005; Hamamoto, 
2006; Acemoglu et al., 2012; Ambec et al., 2013; for a review see Popp, 2010). For the EU ETS 
in particular, Martin et al. (2012) show that regulated sectors facing a more binding constraint are 
more likely to innovate. This result is based on interviews with managers of 770 firms in 6 
countries (Martin et al., 2012). They show that firms expecting higher stringency
43
 in Phase III 
have a higher propensity for innovating. They study the causal characteristic of this correlation by 
using the exemption rules of Phase III. Above a certain threshold of carbon intensity or trade 
intensity (or a combination of both), firms are exempted from auctioning. Assuming that 
auctioning represents a higher constraint (greater costs) to firms than free allocation, they 
examine whether firms expecting to be exempted are less engaged in green innovations or not. 
They analyse the discontinuity around the threshold which might be due to the exemption. In 
doing so, they observe a jump in innovation right after the threshold. Therefore, they conclude 
that free allocation (lower constraint) leads to less clean innovation. This result is in line with other 
researchers stating that an overly generous allocation of free permits may reduce incentives to 
invest in new technologies (Schleich and Betz, 2005).  
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 They construct a stringency score depending on “(i) how costly it would be to reduce its emissions, on (ii) how 
many allowances it receives for free and on (iii) the price they expect on the market and therefore the expected overall 
allocation” (Martin et al., 2012, p.12) 
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In order to induce investments for innovation, a high carbon price is considered necessary (Popp, 
2002). The carbon price is often pinpointed at about €30 per tonne of CO2 (e.g. Ares, 2014). 
However, the EUA price has not been higher than 10 euros since 2013. The European 
Commission is concerned that the low price may prevent investments in low-carbon technologies 
and could even create carbon lock-in (EU Commission, 2014b).
44
 Moreover, its continuing 
declining trend along with its volatility may not provide long-term credibility of a future high carbon 
price, which is necessary for stimulating green investment decisions (Laing et al., 2013).  
Apart from a deficit of stringency and the low carbon price, another reason for limited innovation 
effects stemming from the EU ETS may be that many firms have adopted a wait-and-see strategy 
in the early phase, i.e. prudent investment behaviour (Pontoglio, 2010; Borghesi et al., 2012). 
Borghesi et al. (2012) analyse the impact of the EU ETS on environmental innovations of Italian 
manufacturing industries in 2006-2008, based on data from the Community Innovation Survey 
(CIS) provided by Eurostat. The authors examine both kinds of environmental innovations (EI), 
namely production-related EI (energy and CO2 abatement) and consumption-related EI (reduced 
environmental impact of the product during its life). From their empirical results they conclude that 
the scheme was not strict enough to stimulate the adoption of carbon reduction technologies and 
rather triggered investments for EIs on the consumption side that are less radical and cheaper 
than innovations on the production side. Rogge et al. (2011) base their analysis on case studies 
with 19 German firms from the power sector for the years 2008-2009. Their results indicate that 
the innovation impact of the EU ETS is rather limited. They argue that this is the result of the 
system’s lack of stringency and predictability as well as the important role of other context factors. 
Calel and Dechezleprêtre (2016) do not find evidence of the EU ETS causing spill-over effects on 
third parties’ patenting activity. Therefore, they conclude that the scale of technological change 
might stay limited. 
However, it seems that at least a small number of regulated firms reacted strongly to the new 
constraint, making significant changes on average (Petsonk and Cozijnsen, 2007; Calel and 
Dechezleprêtre, 2016). Petsonk and Cozijnsen (2007) point out that low-carbon solutions have 
been developed at an early stage. Calel and Dechezleprêtre (2016) observe a structural break of 
low-carbon patenting in 2005 presented in figure 10 and investigate whether this is a 
consequence of the EU ETS.  
Figure 10: Share of low-carbon patents in total patents filed with the European Patent Office 
(1978-2009) 
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 “The surplus has resulted in an ETS price signal too weak to significantly affect the price of fossil-fueled power generation, 
which if it is not addressed will have a long lasting effect on the ability of the ETS to provide an incentive to invest in low-carbon 
energy technologies such as renewables. In combination with today's high gas to coal price ratio, it can lead to carbon lock-in.” 
(EU Commission, 2014b), p. 169 
Source: Calel and Dechezleprêtre 
(2016), p. 177. 
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To this end, they use the number of low-carbon patent registrations as innovation measure and 
apply a difference-in-difference design to a large sample of 3428 matched EU ETS firms. The 
evidence shows that the system boosted low-carbon patenting by 36.2% among regulated firms 
relative to non-regulated ones. This percentage drops to 8.1 % when extrapolating results to the 
whole non-matched sample of 5568 EU ETS firms, covering 80% of regulated emissions. In all, 
the EU ETS accounts for 1% of the surge in low-carbon patenting, depicted in figure 10. The 
percentage appears rather small on first sight, since EU ETS firms only account for a small 
proportion of low-carbon patents. Interestingly, the disaggregated level of data enables them to 
see that the average effect is only due to the strong reaction of a small group of firms. In parallel, 
they show that the EU ETS did not crowd out patenting for other technologies and even 
encouraged it moderately. Anderson et al. (2011) surveyed Irish EU ETS firms during the first 
phase and find that the system stimulated technological change and raised awareness about 
emissions reduction possibilities, despite decreasing carbon prices and uncertainty.  
In conclusion, the empirical findings suggest that the innovation behaviour of regulated firms 
attributable to the EU ETS has been limited so far. This may be due to the low stringency of the 
scheme so far (low price, low target, generous free allocation). However, the ex-post literature 
can so far only measure effects on a rather short-term scale, whereas innovations may easily 
take a decade to unfold. Thus, long-term effects may only be detected later. At the same time, 
Phase III of the EU ETS is the first one to use benchmarking for the allocation of emissions 
certificates. This may induce firms to reduce their emissions at least up to the benchmark value 
(de Bruyn et al., 2010b). On top of this, Phase IV aims at lowering the cap of emissions in the EU 
ETS substantially suggesting higher stringency of the scheme. These two innovations may lead 
to more pronounced innovation effects of the EU ETS in the future. 
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4.6 Further hypotheses 
There could be further economic arguments for finding no negative competitiveness effects of the 
EU ETS on firm-level economic performance. For these following arguments, we could, however, 
hardly find any empirical evidence and therefore keep the discussion short. 
Theoretically, abatement costs could have been lower than expected. In that case, firms would 
have faced unexpectedly low costs of reducing emissions which might explain not finding 
significant effects on economic performance. This argument is hard to prove as abatement costs 
are rarely publicly known (Clò, 2010). In fact, the heterogeneity of abatement costs which are, 
however, unobserved to the policy maker (and researcher) is one of the advantages of 
introducing a cap-and-trade system in the first place because this policy equalises marginal 
abatement costs (Schmalensee, Stavins, 2015). Even firms themselves are often unaware of 
their abatement costs. For example, Engels (2009) reports that one third of EU ETS regulated 
firms participating in a survey covering four countries for the years 2005-2007 does not know its 
abatement costs (also see Martin et al., 2016). In fact, the introduction of the EU ETS may 
increase firms’ awareness of their own abatement costs as they are required to monitor and 
report emissions. Similarly, the KfW/ZEW-CO2-Panel repeatedly reports very low shares of ETS 
firms whose abatement activities are driven by the goal of emissions reduction (Detken et al., 
2009; Löschel et al., 2010, 2011 and 2013; Brockmann et al., 2012; Gallier et al., 2014 and 2015; 
Osberghaus et al., 2016). Instead, emissions reductions usually occur as a side effect of 
measures intended to, e.g., reduce production costs. While these survey results do not allow 
conclusions about the level of abatement costs, they show that abatement is not the main focus 
of emissions reduction, despite firms’ participation in the EU ETS. 
Another argument which might potentially explain finding no negative competitiveness effects of 
the EU ETS is related to the restricted entry of competitors: A large-scale environmental 
regulation may substantially increase the sunk costs for new entrants, deterring them to come 
into the market (Ryan, 2012). These sunk costs would include costs for learning about the 
requirements of the EU ETS, for entering into the allocation process as well as one-time costs for 
monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) of emissions. If these costs were high, firms already 
under the ETS would rather be protected from new entrants to the EU market. This topic has not 
been much investigated by researchers, but Civitelli (2016) argues that the scheme discouraged 
the entrance of new competitors at the beginning of the scheme in Italy.  Indeed, the Italian 
government should have established a public fund to finance emissions allowances for new 
entrants but did not. As a consequence, new entrants had to buy their permits while incumbent 
companies received them free of charge. However, the actual costs of entering the ETS remain 
uncertain and might have been low considering the low price of emission allowances.  
In addition, the EU is generally characterised by high environmental standards which may also 
restrict the entry of new competitors (de Bruyn et al., 2010a). For the refinery sector, de Bruyn et 
al. (2010a) argue that few foreign competitors meet European standards such that these 
standards could act as a barrier to entry.  
Furthermore, some “dirty” firms may have faced such high environmental costs from the EU ETS 
that they had to exit the market. In the end, only firms who were competitive in a clean 
environment could have kept business running. In the aggregate this would result in a more 
productive and cleaner business environment. This may explain finding no negative 
competitiveness effects on firms that have stayed in the market. However, no empirical evidence 
of carbon leakage or firm closures attributable due to the EU ETS has been documented so far. 
Calel and Dechezleprêtre (2014) and Wagner et al. (2014) find no supportive evidence for carbon 
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leakage within companies which have non-treated plants during Phase II. Nonetheless, the latter 
study suggests that there could still be carbon leakage between markets but cannot test it.  
Finally, negative effects may be much larger for sectors outside rather than inside the EU ETS, as 
Oberndorfer (2009) argues. This is because under a generous cap of the EU ETS, non-ETS-
regulated sectors have do contribute large emissions reductions in order to still meet the national 
targets set by the Kyoto Protocol (Oberndorfer, 2009; Böhringer et al., 2006). If this argument was 
to hold, it would substantially affect those empirical analyses that compare ETS-regulated to non-
regulated firms, e.g. across industries. Put differently, if for some reason the control group faces 
higher constraints than the treated group, this would explain not finding a statistical effect in the 
comparison. However, in case the regulation differs only across industries then comparisons 
within industries are not affected by this argument.  
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5 Conclusions 
Emissions trading is generally expected to impose costs on firms because these have to either 
abate emissions or to buy the required allowances. This would imply an increase in production 
costs for ETS-regulated vis-a-vis non-regulated firms. However, the empirical ex post literature 
finds no significant negative effects of the EU ETS on firm-level competitiveness during Phase I 
and II (Martin et al., 2016; Arlinghaus, 2015; Venmans, 2012). Also, there has been no indication 
so far of a relevant amount of carbon leakage (European Competitiveness Report, 2014; 
Dechezleprêtre et al., 2014). Therefore, this paper aims to explain this finding by reviewing 
existing literature on five hypotheses. We also reflect to what extent the third phase is similar to 
the previous periods. We find the following: 
First, most emissions certificates in the European Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) have 
been allocated for free by means of grandfathering, at least in the first two trading periods. Only a 
small share of certificates has been auctioned and this share increases only slowly. Free 
allocation entails a higher risk of over-allocation as compared to auctioning.  
Second, we document over-allocation of emission allowances for all three phases. Several 
factors can explain the oversupply of permits, in particular for Phase III. Accordingly, we expect 
no significant negative effects on competitiveness on average for this period. First, a large permit 
surplus from Phase II could have been banked forward into the third period. Second, installations 
have been able to use international credit offsets at almost no cost (at around 0.10€ in 2014), 
instead of buying allowances, whose price is also excessively low. Third, an excessive number of 
sectors seems to have been exempted (totally or partially) from auctioning (Martin et al., 2014b; 
Clò, 2010). Moreover, the EU Commission has used a proxy price of 30€/t CO2 to estimate which 
sectors are at risk, which is way higher than the current price (<5€/t in the first half of 2016). 
Therefore, the relocation risk has likely been overestimated and thus too many certificates have 
been allocated (Martin et al., 2014a). 
While the oversupply of allowances does not come as a surprise, this fact seems to have caused 
the observed price drop of EUA prices. In consequence, participation in the EU ETS is cheap 
even for firms who are short of certificates and incentives for abatement or innovation are 
reduced. On top of this, over-allocation combined with free allocation and a positive allowance 
price can generate windfall profits.  
Third, firms in many regulated sectors have been able to pass-through the (opportunity) costs of 
the EU ETS onto their customers. Particularly high pass-through rates have been documented for 
the power sector thanks to its particular market structure. Within energy-intense manufacturing, 
some sectors display high pass-through rates (e.g. refining and iron and steel) while others do not 
(some sub-sectors from the chemical and from the pulp and paper industry). In case of a high 
(opportunity) cost pass-through, additional windfall profits may be incurred and the consumers 
bear the costs of the EU ETS. This might affect electricity consumers in households and in 
industry. In addition, in case rising electricity prices affected ETS-regulated and non-regulated 
firms alike, it would also make it difficult to empirically identify this indirect effect on 
competitiveness. 
Fourth, energy costs make up about 5% of gross output on average. This may explain why 
increases in these costs via the carbon price may hardly affect firms’ competitiveness on 
average. Some specific firms or sectors may still display high energy cost shares, such as the 
refining sector which is, however, protected by the carbon leakage list. 
Fifth, we checked whether innovation is stimulated in such a way by the EU ETS so as to 
overcompensate otherwise negative competitiveness effects. However, so far only limited 
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innovation effects could be detected likely because innovations require a longer time horizon to 
unfold. Another reason for finding low innovation effects from the EU ETS is the low price for EUA 
certificates which may, in turn, be caused by the large oversupply of allowances. This is where 
the low carbon price may pose a problem, as clean innovation is the only way to switch towards a 
sustainable path in the long-term. 
These findings show that the EU ETS has effectively reduced greenhouse gas emissions in the 
regulated sectors without incurring substantial competitiveness effects. This result holds for the 
current design of the EU ETS and in particular for the current level of the cap. In case the 
regulation turns to be more stringent in the future, this would likely change abatement activities as 
well as competitiveness effects. 
Finally, this study focusses on direct effects of the EU ETS on firm level competitiveness. For 
example, a large part of the empirical ex post literature compares regulated to non-regulated 
firms within industries, assuming that non-regulated firms are less affected by the regulation. 
There could, however, be indirect effects of the EU ETS, most prominently through increased 
electricity prices. Studying such indirect effects is an important and difficult challenge which we 
leave to future research. 
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